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 ESSAY
 DEFERENCE" IS TOO CONFUSING—LET'S CALL THEM
 "CHEVRON SPACE" AND "SKIDMORE WEIGHT"
 Peter L. Strauss*
 This Essay suggests an underappreciated, appropriate, and concep
 tually coherent structure to the Chevron relationship of courts to agen
 cies, grounded in the concept of "allocation. " Because the term "defer
 ence" muddles rather than clarifies the structure's operation, this Essay
 avoids speaking of "Chevron deference" and "Skidmore deference. "
 Rather, it argues, one could more profitably think in terms of "Chevron
 space" and "Skidmore weight. " "Chevron space" denotes the area
 within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered
 to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that
 is, its allocated authority. "Skidmore weight" addresses the possibility
 that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in itself war
 rant the respect of judges who are themselves unmistakably responsible
 for deciding the question of statutory meaning.
 "Skidmore weight" has an underappreciated pedigree. For almost
 two centuries, American courts have given agency views of statutory
 meaning considerable weight in deciding for themselves issues of statu
 tory meaning. "Chevron space" reflects our more recent understanding
 and acceptance that Congress may validly confer on executive agencies
 the authority to act with the force of law, so long as the legality of their
 action within the boundaries of their authority can be judicially assured.
 Within its congressionally authorized space, the agency is the prime ac
 tor. From a court's independent conclusion that Congress has delegated
 authority to an agency—a conclusion that may even be informed by
 Skidmore weight given to the agency's own understandings of its au
 thority—it follows ineluctably that the reviewing court is to act, not as
 decider, but as overseer.
 * Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Warm thanks to my colleagues
 Gillian Metzger and Thomas Merrill and friends Kevin Stack, Ronald Levin, and Todd
 Rakoff for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to Jonathan Marcus (Columbia Law
 School, class of 2012) for fine research support, and to the editors of the Columbia Law
 Review for undertaking to supply parentheticals for many footnote citations, and my
 apologies for any errors which may remain.
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 Introduction
 Administrative law scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring
 the mysteries of the Chevron approach contemporary judges take to re
 viewing law-related aspects of administrative action.1 Without wishing to
 deny for a moment that judicial practice has been inconstant2—influ
 enced by the importance of the matter, by the accessibility of the issues
 to nonexpert judges, by politics, and by the earned reputations of differ
 ing agencies—this Essay suggests that there is an underappreciated, ap
 propriate, and conceptually coherent structure to the Chevron relation
 ship of courts to agencies, a structure whose basic impulse may be cap
 tured by the concept of "allocation." Understanding judicial review of
 administrative action as a consequence of and in relationship to congres
 sional delegations of authority to administrative agencies—allocations of
 role as between agency and court—reveals a relatively simple and coher
 ent structure for the law-related side of the conventional model of judi
 cial review as it has developed over the years.
 To lay the groundwork for this understanding, this Essay begins with
 a short account and critique of an article on the history of American ap
 proaches to judicial review of agency action published here last spring by
 my colleague, Thomas Merrill.3 After briefly addressing the question of
 judicial review of agency fact-finding, another setting in which achieving
 coherence has proved difficult, it turns to the effort of reconciling the
 judiciary's "exclusive" responsibility for statutory interpretation with con
 gressional delegations to agencies of the authority to create legal regimes
 within the space allocated to them by their governing statutes. In doing
 so, it will explore a tension that has animated much of the judicial and
 academic discussion between Chevron and an earlier decision addressing
 the relationship of courts and agencies in interpreting statutes, Skidmore
 v. Swifi & Co.4 Both opinions describe the relationship they are address
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). A
 March 2012 Lexis search of law reviews and journals for "Title (Chevron) and 467 US 837"
 returned 183 entries; a search of the same database for "Chevron pre/5 two-step or two
 step!," 609 entries. By contrast, "Title(State Farm) and 463 US 29" returned only one en
 try; "State Farm and (Automobile Manufacturers or Automobile Mfrs.) and 5 U.S.C.
 706(2) (A)," fourteen entries.
 2. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
 Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (arguing in most cases courts "rel(y) on ad hoc judicial rea
 soning"); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
 Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 59-60 (1998) (concluding ex
 isting models of Chevron doctrine do not predict actual outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
 and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2075 (1990) (noting Chevron
 "raises at least as many questions as it answers").
 3. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appel
 late Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939 (2011) [hereinafter
 Merrill, Origins].
 4. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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 ing as "deference," a term courts have commonly used in describing the
 court-agency relationship in regard to statutory interpretation. As will be
 seen, neither decision was an innovation. Like "discretion,"5 however,
 "deference" is a highly variable, if not empty, concept. It is sometimes
 used in the sense of "obey" or "accept," and sometimes as "respectfully
 consider." Instead of "Chevron deference," this Essay will urge the use of
 "Chevron space"; instead of "Skidmore deference," "Skidmore weight."
 "Chevron space denotes the area within which an administrative
 agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates
 legal obligations or constraints—that is, its delegated or allocated author
 ity. The whole idea of "agency" is that the agent has a certain authority, a
 zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it. What that zone is
 requires defining—more on this to come6—but within that zone, within
 its "Chevron space," the whole point of the empowering legislation is to
 allocate authority to the agency. Faced with the exercise of such author
 ity, the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is to
 see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and that the
 game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts themselves to
 play the game. From a finding of law that Congress has validly allocated
 authority to a noncourt body, it follows ineluctably that that other body
 has the authority to decide the issues allocated to it, subject to such judi
 cial supervision as oversight entails. Courts are, of course, ultimately re
 sponsible for deciding questions of law, but one such question is: "How
 much authority has validly been allocated to this agency?" The answer to
 that question is an element of the law the court is ultimately responsible
 to find and obey.
 "Skidmore weight" addresses the possibility that an agency's view on a
 given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by judges who
 themselves have ultimate interpretive authority. Congress sometimes cre
 ates administrative bodies to which it allocates not responsibility for di
 rect, legally effective action, but rather duties to provide guidance and to
 invoke judicial enforcement. The Labor Department's Wage and Hour
 Division, which is responsible for the guidance concerning the Fair
 Labor Standards Act that was in play in Skidmore, is typical. It does not
 find facts or seek internally to enforce the Act. It can, however, bring in
 junctive enforcement actions in court and issue advice to enquiring busi
 nesses about the Act's bearing on their concerns. Writing about the
 5. Compare the differing uses of "discretion" in 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (2006) (pre
 cluding review of matters committed to agency discretion) and § 706(2) (A) (inviting re
 view of agency action for abuse of discretion). Consider also the variety of meanings courts
 give the latter provision's use of "discretion" as a description of the standard of review,
 when it is applied to refusals to engage in rulemaking, see Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng,
 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987), to informal adjudications, see Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
 142 (1973), and to high-consequence rulemakings, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the
 U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
 6. See infra Part III.A.2.
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 agency s functions in the late 1960s, Judge Harold Leventhal emphasized
 these characteristics of the division and found that it was issuing about
 750,000 letter rulings per year, of which about 10,000 came signed by the
 Administrator.7 Even agencies that Congress has empowered to act with
 legal force sometimes choose not to exercise that authority, but rather to
 guide—to indicate desired directions without undertaking (as they
 might) to compel them. In all of these contexts, precisely because the
 agency has not been authorized to act definitively, or if so authorized has
 not chosen to do so, the courts may ultimately be responsible for deci
 sions on issues about which guidance has been given. Ought they, then,
 simply ignore such views as the agency may have expressed? Courts will
 encounter the questions involved only sporadically, haphazardly, and
 without any underlying responsibility for the statutory scheme. In con
 trast, the agency may constantly be issuing guidance about the integrated
 body of its constituent statutes. Its responsibility is to assist in their im
 plementation in a coherent, intelligent way. The agency may have helped
 to draft the statutory language, and was likely present and attentive
 throughout its legislative consideration. Its views about statutory meaning
 may have been shaped in the immediate wake of enactment, under the
 enacting Congress's watchful eye. All of these are reasons for courts, in
 reaching their decisions, to accord these views "Skidmore weight." It is not
 only that agencies have the credibility of their circumstances, but also
 that they can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally uni
 form understanding of the law that would be disrupted by the variable
 results to be expected from a geographically and politically diverse judi
 ciary encountering the hardest (that is to say, the most likely to be liti
 gated) issues with little experience with the overall scheme and its pat
 terns.
 Seeing the difference in this way—Chevron space as a consequence of
 delegation and Skidmore weight as an element of independent judicial
 judgment—helps to rationalize what might otherwise appear to be an in
 consistency in the two usages. Within their delegated "space," agencies
 are permitted to change their views from time to time, and while the
 changes must be explained to establish their reasonableness in ordinary
 policy-review terms, the fact of change does not deprive the new view of
 its Chevron effect.8 But if an agency's views vacillate over time, that de
 tracts from, if it does not entirely eliminate, any Skidmore weight to which
 they might otherwise be entitled.9 Chevron imagines the agency as a poli
 7. Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 699 (D.C.
 Cir. 1971).
 8. See, e.g., Epilepsy Found, of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
 2001) (accepting NLRB interpretation although agency had reversed itself multiple
 times).
 9. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) ("If we were
 obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in finding the meaning of
 the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's decision would leave us in the dark."). The
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 cymaker, appropriately responsive to the political views of the President
 in office at any given time. Indeed, Congress has created the agency's
 freedom to act within its space anticipating presidential oversight.
 Skidmore, on the other hand, is grounded in a construct of the agency as
 responsible expert, arguably possessing special knowledge of the statu
 tory meaning a court should consider in reaching its own judgment. It
 thus serves as a political filter for agency authority where such authority
 was not delegated to an agency by the legislature. In considering how
 persistent a particular agency interpretation or finding has been, Skidmore
 treats variances occurring with the changing of the political guard as a
 negative, not a positive, factor. Under Skidmore, courts credit findings that
 are likely to be politically neutral, that may have lasted through a number
 of political changes. This is not just a matter of efficiency; it also respects
 the complex relationship amongst the legislature, executive, and judici
 ary.10
 "Chevron space" also helps in understanding the disagreement in
 National Cable & Telecommunication Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services.11
 There, eight members of the Court said that the Federal
 Communications Commission (FCC), in reaching a judgment within its
 allocated authority, had no need to regard itself as bound by the Ninth
 Circuit's prior judicial decision of the same issue in private litigation.12
 Justice Scalia, vigorously dissenting, characterized this as a violation of
 constitutionally requisite executive-judicial relations.13 Suppose that
 Congress has created some "Chevron space" for a responsible agency, and
 a court finds itself compelled by private litigation to decide a matter fal
 ling within that space. Congress has given the FCC responsibility for de
 fining the difference (if any, in our information age) between telecom
 munications services and data services, whether offered over land wires
 or wirelessly. Yet private litigation may require a court to essay the same
 definition. If this happens, is that court's decision more than provisional?
 As between the parties to a dispute, the New Jersey Supreme Court or the
 Second Circuit deciding a point of New York law must, as best it can, fi
 nally resolve the particular dispute thrust upon it; yet, in doing so, it will
 have no illusion that it is settling New York law on the point. Definitively
 fixing New York law is the business of the New York courts. Similarly, in
 the supposed case, Congress has allocated definitive resolution (within
 Packard opinion was written by Justice Jackson, the author of Skidmore.
 10. Thanks to my research assistant, Jonathan Marcus, for suggesting the thoughts
 expressed in this paragraph. While I am as confident as he that the political stability of
 views has been seen as a positive attribute of Skidmore weight, I cannot recall having seen
 the matter put quite this way previously.
 11. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
 12. Id. at 983 (stating agency, as "authoritative interpreter," may choose a different
 construction than the court).
 13. Id. at 1016-17 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.75 on Thu, 07 Apr 2016 19:25:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1148  COL UMBIA LA W REVIEW  [Vol. 112:5
 the bounds of its Chevron space) to the FCC. The situations seem quite
 the same.14
 I. Yesterday and Today
 This piece is unapologetically limited to the approach contemporary
 judges take to the review of law-related aspects of administrative action.
 Professor Merrill's Article in these pages last spring15 gave a striking ac
 count of the emergence of the American appellate review model during
 the Progressive era and up to the New Deal, as America's industrializa
 tion catalyzed paradigm shifts in the way Americans thought about the
 uses of government16 and judges resisted the resulting statutory
 changes.17 The resulting allocation of what might simply have been judi
 cial business to alternative, "administrative" bodies, he persuasively ar
 gued, prompted the development of an appellate review model quite dis
 tinct from anything in prior American law or other parts of the common
 law world. His analysis drew particularly on judicial shifts in approach to
 the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in the wake of a
 statute reflecting "an upsurge in public dissatisfaction with aggressive ju
 dicial review of [its] decisions,"18 but failing to come to rest on any defini
 tive new standard. Renouncing its prior willingness to decide matters de
 novo (that is, to substitute judicial for administrative judgment), yet still
 engaged, the Court developed the contemporary model as an essentially
 political reaction to that statute.19 Professor Merrill attributed this devel
 opment to an underlying fear that courts might be yet further weakened
 14. See generally Kenneth Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility
 in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272 (2002) (anticipating Brand X)\
 Kathryn Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 997
 (2007) (understanding Brand Xin this fashion).
 15. Merrill, Origins, supra note 3.
 16. See generally John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen,
 Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law 126-51, 187-207 (2004) (describ
 ing progression from free labor to social-insurance-oriented political traditions from late
 nineteenth century through New Deal).
 17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908), is the conventional canon, but consider
 also Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902) (resisting statutory modification of
 common law doctrine of assumption of risk for railroad workers injured by violation of
 federal safety appliance statute), rev'd, 196 U.S. 1 (1904) (used as stalking horse for this
 phenomenon in Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1133-44, 1149
 56 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)); the legislative-judicial strug
 gles over labor injunctions during this period; and the distrust of courts that strongly in
 fluenced the creation of worker compensation tribunals, Louis Jaffe & Nathaniel
 Nathanson, Administrative Law Cases and Materials 133-36 (2d ed. 1961).
 18. Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 953. The statute was the Hepburn Act, Pub. L.
 No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
 19. Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 959, 963 (arguing Court responded to "the mes
 sage encoded in the Hepburn Act" by developing doctrine "that would permit it to back
 off without losing face").
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 if they could not come up with an acceptable formula for what the
 Senate had been unable to resolve in months of weary debate.20
 At root, that formula involved acceptance of Congress s increasing
 tendency to allocate primary responsibility for implementing new statu
 tory schemes away from the courts and into administrative agencies. Pre
 viously, unless somehow they analogized it to the function of a special
 master, courts subjected the work of administrators to correction, if at all,
 simply for ultra vires illegality. Courts feared that to do more, as
 Professor Merrill demonstrated, might taint the judicial function with
 executive administration, as is forbidden by Article Ill's devolution of
 only the judicial power on federal courts.21 Yet alongside its broad and in
 creasing allocations of responsibilities to administrative agencies,
 Congress regularly and explicitly commanded the courts to supervise the
 resulting actions. Courts came to the view that these delegations could be
 tolerated if and only if the responsibility of review was accepted.22
 "Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—and
 courts have upheld such delegation," Judge Leventhal once perspica
 ciously remarked, "because there is court review to assure that the agency
 exercises the delegated power within statutory limits."23 Agencies must be
 subject to judicial controls that reach into their assessment of factual and
 law-applying issues, that is, not to displace their responsibilities, but to as
 sure their responsible, rational exercise. In 1946, the Administrative
 Procedure Act (APA) would embody this change.24 The issue thus has re
 mained one of "allocation," but with that allocation understood to have
 been purchased with the coin of continuing judicial control.
 Professor Merrill, appearing to regret this acceptance of factual and
 law-applying review responsibilities, concluded with the wistful conces
 sion that:
 [TJhe appellate review model is so deeply entrenched in
 American political culture that it is impossible to imagine
 20. Id. at 959.
 21. Id. at 987-92 (discussing "fear of. . . drawing federal courts into matters regarded
 as being the province of the other branches of government").
 22. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), a relatively early judicial reaction to the
 breadth of authority delegated to the Federal Trade Commission that Professor Merrill
 evokes, Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 970, is readily understood as a response to dele
 gation concerns. There, in its assessment of the statute granting the FTC the power to in
 stitute proceedings against those it had reason to believe were engaging in "unfair meth
 ods of competition," the Supreme Court declared that the Court itself had final word on
 what constituted such practices. 253 U.S. at 427-29.
 23. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
 One may note that Judge Leventhal is also the acknowledged progenitor of "hard look re
 view," see Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
 (Leventhal, J.)—an approach which, whatever its impact on agency behaviors, Congress
 has shown no sign of repudiating.
 24. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1946) (codified as amended at
 5U.S.C. §706 (2006)).
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 wrenching free from its influence. The best that can be ex
 pected is that courts, especially the Supreme Court, will con
 tinue to whittle away at the scope of judicial authority over ques
 tions of policy, leaving courts the functions of policing the
 boundaries of administrative action.25
 Yet a return to ultra vires analysis would repudiate Congress s re
 peated judgments as well as reduce agency connections to the rule of law.
 "Policing the boundaries" is a more limited judicial role than is necessary
 to avoid "judicial authority over questions of policy." Proper respect for
 legislative allocations, we would both agree, requires that judges abjure
 engagement with policy decisions allocated to agencies. A court must
 understand that it is "not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
 of the agency"26 where an agency, not a court, is the designated actor.
 But (as in sporting events) if the courts are to be referees and not
 players—overseers and not deciders27—their function may nonetheless
 include supervising an agency's actions within its designated boundaries,
 as well as declaring when it has overstepped them. Though judges, like
 anyone, may be tempted to stray from their proper roles, permitting
 them to consider the relationship between the facts known to the agency
 and its conclusions in addition to the "boundary" question of ultra vires
 does not authorize them to decide questions of policy. Today's adminis
 trative review model embraces both elements of refereeing—policing the
 agency's boundaries and supervising its actions within them—and this
 short Essay does not find that embrace problematic.
 II. Judicial Engagement with Administrative Findings of Fact
 Before moving on to consider judicial review of issues of interpreta
 tion, with which the bulk of this Essay is concerned, it may be useful
 briefly to address judicial review of agency fact-finding, an activity that
 clearly extends judicial review past the ultra vires function that Professor
 Merrill appears to prefer as the limit of judicial engagement with agency
 action. Reviewing fact-finding is a familiar function for courts in their re
 lationships with trial judges, juries, and legislatures, and that suggests the
 importance of attending to possible confusion between the permissibility
 of a review relationship regarding factual findings and the standards of
 review to be applied. In reviewing economic legislation for constitution
 ality, courts regularly purport to determine whether a fact-grounded ba
 sis for judgment can be imagined; in reviewing jury verdicts, whether rea
 sonable jurors could not permissibly have reached this conclusion on the
 evidence offered them; in reviewing a trial judge's jury-independent find
 ing of fact, whether it was "clearly erroneous." While hardly mathemati
 25. Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 1003.
 26. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
 27. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"—The Courts in
 Administrative Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (2008).
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 cally precise, all these formulae recognize that the reviewing judge is to
 accept judgments by others that she might not have reached on her own.
 She must accept findings in whose truth she has less than the 50+% con
 fidence de novo decisionmaking would connote. The standards' variance
 reflects differences in the institutions whose judgments she is reviewing.
 Thus, she has less of an obligation to accept jury findings than legislative
 findings regarding economic legislation, for which an imagined factual
 basis will do; but she has more of an obligation to accept jury findings
 than to accept the independent factual findings of a trial judge sitting
 without a jury. These variations have counterparts in the differing verbal
 formulae judges habitually apply in describing the initial fact-finding
 functions of judge or jury in civil or criminal litigation.28
 It can hardly be surprising that, when they are reviewing agency fact
 finding, courts analogize to the standards they apply in other review set
 tings. Administrative law's two fact review standards ("arbitrary and ca
 pricious" and "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a
 whole") might seem to have a similar less/more relationship—"substan
 tial evidence," like "clearly erroneous," requiring greater proximity to
 50% confidence in the correctness of the outcome. Their judicial treat
 ment, however, has been thoroughly confused. On the one hand, the
 Court has treated "substantial evidence" as marginally, perhaps imper
 ceptibly, less demanding than "clearly erroneous"29 and found in it an ex
 pression of congressional "mood" for more intense factual scrutiny.30 On
 the other, Justices have described both arbitrary and capricious review
 and substantial evidence review as analogous to the review of jury ver
 dicts, as if there were no difference in intensity between them.31
 Perhaps the more vexing question has been whether a mere review
 relationship is permissible at all. Doesn't the allocation of fact-finding re
 28. Three common formulae are proof by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e.,
 50.0001% persuaded), by clear and convincing evidence (i.e., a fair bit more than that), or
 beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., virtually certain).
 29. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162-63 (1999) (characterizing difference
 between "substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards as "a subtle one").
 30. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). To the same effect in
 a rulemaking context, see Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
 467, 472-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which the court found that a statutory requirement of
 "substantial evidence" review of OSHA informal rulemaking requires a harder look than
 usual.
 31. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67
 (1998) (equating substantial evidence review with whether "reasonable jury" could have
 arrived at Board's conclusion); cf. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors
 of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (ScaliaJ.) (holding "there
 is no substantive difference between" arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial evidence
 tests). It is striking that these decisions both rely on NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
 Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939), a decision handed down before the enactment of the
 APA and so presumably undercut by the shift in "mood" Justice Frankfurter discerned in
 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487.
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 sponsibilities to an agency violate the Constitution's assignment of the
 judicial power—all of it—to Article III judges? If there were no need for
 courts to be involved—if Congress could constitutionally allocate author
 ity to executive branch actors without engaging the judiciary at all—there
 could be no such objection, even should Congress choose nonetheless to
 create a cause of action testing agency results. That "case or controversy"
 would be proper judicial business, to be carried out as Congress had in
 structed. But suppose a setting in which judicial participation is not sim
 ply up to Congress to choose, in which the assignment to an agency of
 adjudicative authority could not constitutionally be made absent judicial
 involvement. As Professor Merrill relates,32 that question came before the
 Court in Crowell v. Benson33 at the end of the period his Article considers.
 The Court solved the problem by treating the agency concerned, the
 United States Employees' Compensation Commission (USECC), as a ju
 dicial adjunct comparable to a special master. Like the workers' compen
 sation boards states had created, in large part to avoid judicial resistance
 to changes in the common law treatment of workplace injury, the
 USECC served only to determine the facts of a particular worker's claim
 to compensation from his employer under the statutory scheme. As is
 generally the case today in relation to agency action, courts were given
 only limited authority to review its conclusions of fact. Although the
 Court concluded that Congress was not constitutionally free to create
 such a regime without providing for some participation by judges, it res
 cued the measure by treating the USECC as if it were acting within
 Article III, using the special master analogy.34
 The special master analogy has not invariably proved sufficient, even
 for institutions that, like the USECC, are single-function bodies that only
 adjudicate. Bankruptcy judges unquestionably act within the aegis of the
 judicial branch. Like U.S. Magistrates, they are appointed by the judiciary
 itself, but lack the full protections of tenure and financial security re
 quired for the Article III judiciary. Twice the Court has held (once in a
 fractured opinion that produced only a judgment of the Court35 but just
 this past Term by a simple majority36) that Congress had unconstitution
 ally allocated a degree of authority to them that could properly be as
 signed only to an Article III judge.
 Matters become more complex when one considers adjudications by
 full-function agencies that resolve essentially private disputes—the
 NLRB, the SEC, or the CFTC enforcing their statutes or regulations in
 response to private complaints that may lead to the assessment of a fine.
 In recent years, the Court has properly begun to characterize the full
 32. Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 980-82.
 33. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
 34. Id. at 56-61.
 35. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
 36. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
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 range of authority Congress has conferred on these agencies—to adopt
 regulations, to bring proceedings to enforce their rules and statutes, and
 in the first instance to decide whether violations have occurred—as
 executive authority.37 Unlike bankruptcy judges, these agencies cannot
 plausibly be located within the judicial branch; characterization as a judi
 cial adjunct is thus unavailable. Nor can one imagine the judgment that,
 for these matters, Congress would be free entirely to omit judicial
 involvement—completely to substitute agencies for courts. Congress's ar
 rangements are accepted only because agency outcomes are reviewable
 on demand, so that ultimately a court will assess their propriety under
 the prevailing standards of review. Adequate judicial review, the Court
 has held, is the condition of accepting these allocations of quasi-judicial
 function.38
 In the end, in my judgment, the acceptability of congressional allo
 cations of some decisional authority, whether exercised by trial-like or by
 legislation-like processes, will come down to the same question—the
 adequacy of judicial controls to assure legality. Congress's delegation of
 quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial authority is conditioned, as Judge
 Leventhal wisely observed, on Congress's provision for judicial review—
 on, that is, the appellate review model.39 It is not, as the "public right"
 formulation initially asserted, that the provision for review is simply a
 voluntary congressional precaution; the allocation of authority to the
 agency is valid if and only if there is judicial review to assure the legality
 of its exercise.
 iii. Substituting Weight and "Space for "Deference" in Describing
 the Impacts on Judicial Function of Agency Statutory
 Interpretations
 A. Laying the Foundations
 1. Weight. — Skidmore v. Swifi & Co.,40 a Jackson opinion of 1944, is
 the conventional citation for the proposition that, at least in some cir
 cumstances, courts are obliged to take an agency's view about statutory
 meaning into account when interpreting statutes the agency administers.
 37. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (describ
 ing EPA rulemaking as exercise of executive power). Justice Stevens dissented from this
 characterization. Id. at 487 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
 38. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Schor approved a sort of pendent
 jurisdiction over state law counterclaims closely related to a consumer's effort to enforce
 CFTC law against a broker. Id. at 847, 857. It is striking that the only issue of concern to
 the Court was the counterclaim. The Court did not notice its easy assumption that
 Congress could authorize a private individual to invoke the jurisdiction of an administra
 tive agency in an action to collect money damages from another private person for his vio
 lation of (regulatory) law.
 39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
 40. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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 The Administrator of the Department of Labor s Wage and Hour
 Division had set forth views about the application of the Fair Labor
 Standards Act to such circumstances as appeared in the case, which the
 courts below simply ignored in concluding that the Act's language did
 not permit its application.41 The Court reversed, per Justice Jackson:
 There is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference
 courts should pay to the Administrator's conclusions. . . . The
 rulings of this Administrator ... do not constitute an interpreta
 tion of the Act or a standard forjudging factual situations which
 binds a district court's processes, as an authoritative pro
 nouncement of a higher court might do. But the
 Administrator's policies ... do determine the policy which will
 guide applications for enforcement by injunction on behalf of
 the Government. Good administration of the Act and good ju
 dicial administration alike require that the standards of public
 enforcement and those for determining private rights shall be
 at variance only where justified by very good reasons. . . . This
 Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive
 weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of
 the Treasury and of other bodies that were not of adversary ori
 gin.
 We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions
 of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
 the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
 experience and informed judgment to which courts and liti
 gants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
 judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough
 ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
 consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
 those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
 to control.42
 While the last paragraph of the quoted text is the matter invariably
 quoted when invoking Skidmore weight, note Justice Jackson's invocation
 of prior practice in the immediately preceding sentence. It is unsurpris
 ing that he felt no need to cite authority for this commonplace proposi
 tion. Cases reaching back well into the nineteenth century had reasoned
 that settled administrative interpretations, or administrative interpreta
 tions contemporaneous with enactment, are "entitled to very great re
 spect,"43 and ought not be disturbed if they are possibly within the mean
 ing of statutory language,44 or "overruled without cogent reasons."45
 These propositions, repeated time and again, may be found in cases in
 41. Id. at 136, 140.
 42. Id. at 139-40.
 43. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).
 44. United States v. State Bank of N.C., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 39 (1832).
 45. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
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 volving public lands administration,46 tax administration,47 and ICC ac
 tions.48 Justice Cardozo had invoked them in writing an influential pas
 sage in a 1933 case involving the tariff laws:
 True indeed it is that administrative practice does not avail to
 overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to leave nothing
 for construction. True it also is that administrative practice,
 consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned
 except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is
 indefinite and doubtful. The practice has peculiar weight when
 it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
 men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
 motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while
 they are yet untried and new.49
 Seven years later, United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns would ratify
 this sense of Skidmore's historic pedigree.50 In one breath, the majority in
 voked the Marbury v. Madison tradition of judicial supremacy in statutory
 interpretation: "The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied
 to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function."51 Yet in an
 other breath, just a few pages further on, the Court invoked the signifi
 cance of agency views for courts performing this "exclusively . . . judicial
 function":
 In any case [well-established interpretations by responsible
 agencies] are entitled to great weight. This is peculiarly true
 here where the interpretations involve "contemporaneous con
 struction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility
 of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work ef
 ficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Fur
 thermore, the Commission's interpretation gains much persua
 46. See, e.g., Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 627 (1914) (citing numerous cases and
 declaring "the settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or uncertain
 statute by the Executive Department charged with its administration . . . will not be dis
 turbed except for very cogent reasons"); see also Swendig v. Wash. Water Power Co., 265
 U.S. 322, 331 (1924) (citing Logan, 233 U.S. 613).
 47. See, e.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931); Brewster v.
 Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930).
 48. See, e.g., ICC v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 287 U.S. 178, 190 (1932).
 49. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (cita
 tions omitted). The procedural claims at issue in this case would surely have succeeded in
 defeating the agency's action had they arisen in an adjudicatory context. The Court de
 nied them, however, characterizing the tariff "hearings" as fundamentally legislative in
 character. Id. at 305. It thus reasserted the fundamental distinction respecting procedural
 claims reflected in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
 445 (1915). Norwegian Nitrogen, 288 U.S. at 308. As an exercise in statutory interpretation,
 Justice Cardozo's opinion is remarkable for the sophistication with which it evokes both
 legislative and administrative practice and understandings.
 50. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
 51. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
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 siveness from the fact that it was the Commission which sug
 gested the provisions' enactment to Congress.52
 This way of framing the proposition well illustrates the "weight"
 stance that Skidmore would later come to characterize. What is "exclusively
 a judicial function" does not exclude agency views. Once a question of
 statutory interpretation has been put before a court, it is for the court to
 resolve the question of meaning. Among the matters indispensable for it
 to consider, however, are the meanings attributed to it by prior (adminis
 trative) interpreters, their stability, and the possibly superior body of in
 formation and more embracive responsibilities that underlay them. They
 may be entitled to great "weight" on the judicial scales. No innovation,
 the Skidmore formulation rephrased in Justice Jackson's memorable prose
 a set of long-established propositions.33
 2. Space. — In the Progressive Era and then the New Deal, legislation
 proliferated, increasingly engaging the courts with legislative business.
 Often enough, that legislation reacted against the common law's laissez
 faire, fault-regarding foundations, and sought to provide greater protec
 tion for the common man against the Industrial Age's increasingly com
 plex and sophisticated technology, markets, and corporations. As judges
 defending the common law and its premises proved resistant to these
 changes (and, as generalists, also showed themselves unlikely to be sound
 implementers of increasingly specialized and technical responses to soci
 ety's industrialization and its effects), this legislation also created admin
 istrative agencies responsible to administer the new legislative schemes.54
 A dominant task for a judiciary thus challenged would be to fashion a
 role for itself that both accepted the reality of these new institutions (and
 the political will underlying them), and preserved core judicial
 functions—notably, what was "exclusively" their responsibility for "[t]he
 interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable contro
 versies."55
 The Constitution's text straightforwardly imagines Congress's as
 signment of "powers" and "duties" of administration to executive branch
 actors.56 In making such assignments, Congress has from the outset allo
 cated statutorily defined elements of discretion to the actors it has cre
 ated. When only common law writs were available to review this discre
 52. Id. at 549 (footnote omitted) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen, 288 U.S. at 315).
 53. For a persuasive discussion of the nature of Shidmore weight, arguing that it has
 not been simply a makeweight judicial disguise for conclusions independendy reached, see
 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235,1251-59,1271 (2007).
 54. See Louis L. Jaffe & Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and
 Materials 122-24 (4th ed. 1976); Peter L. Strauss, Legal Methods: Understanding and Us
 ing Cases and Statutes 398-99 (2d ed. 2005); Witt, supra note 16, at 188-89, 202-03.
 55. Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. at 544.
 56. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also id. art. II, § 3 (charging
 Executive to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (emphasis added)).
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 tion s exercise, as Professor Merrill noted, ultra vires analysis of agency
 action was about all there was to be had (and that analysis was influ
 enced, as has been seen, by a practice of giving significant "weight" to
 agency views) ,57 How an agency might have used the discretion thus con
 ferred on it was forbidden territory. Marbury v. Madison,58 the pole star
 assertion of the "exclusive" judicial responsibility for interpretation,
 adamandy asserted the impropriety of any judicial supervision whatsoever
 over the discretionary actions of the executive branch:
 [W]here the heads of departments are ... to act in cases in
 which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discre
 tion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts
 are only politically examinable.. ..
 . . . The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
 rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or ex
 ecutive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
 Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
 constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
 made in this court.59
 Half a century later, the Court would replace "only" and "never" with
 a willingness to accept congressional assignments of a judicial review
 function—but on an important condition:
 [W]e think it proper to state that we do not consider congress
 can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which,
 from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
 equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under
 the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a sub
 ject for judicial determination. At the same time there are mat
 ters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
 form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
 which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
 congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
 United States, as it may deem proper. . . . [A] s it depends upon the
 will of congress whether a remedy in the courts shall be allowed
 at all, in such cases, they may regulate it and prescribe such
 rules of determination as they may think just and needful.60
 The condition, that is, was that the involvement of the judiciary was
 wholly optional, not required. In 1929, the Court could cite a baker's
 dozen additional cases for the proposition that
 57. See Merrill, Origins, supra note 3, at 948-53 ("Review was often narrow, as when
 the court applying the prerogative writs asked whether the agency was acting within its ju
 risdiction or whether an officer had violated a nondiscretionary legal duty.").
 58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
 59. Id. at 166,170.
 60. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
 284 (1855) (emphasis added).
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 [1] egislative courts . . . may be created as special tribunals to ex
 amine and determine various matters, arising between the gov
 ernment and others, which from their nature do not require
 judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode
 of determining matters of this class is completely within con
 gressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the power to
 decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may
 commit it to judicial tribunals.61
 Crowell v. Benson was decided three years later, on the eve of the New
 Deal.62 Where Congress had assigned an executive and not a judicial
 function (for the latter, it was the "judicial adjunct" approach that saved
 the assignment) ,63 Crowell reiterated that the "public right" formulations
 just quoted controlled.64
 Again, the tiling to notice m these early public right formulations
 is that the permissibility of judicial review is premised on the proposition
 that, in the cases being provided for, Congress has no need whatsoever to
 provide for judicial engagement, although it may volunteer to do so.
 While the relationship between Article I "legislative courts" created by
 Congress (in the executive branch) and Article III courts remains a sig
 nificant intellectual puzzle,65 the limitation of review in "public rights"
 cases to ones in which judicial engagement is optional clearly has been
 undermined. The constitutionality of the CFTC's action in Schor was sus
 tained only because the adjudication scheme provided for adequate judi
 cial review.66 One finds the same in cases invoking a "due process" right
 to appellate review (however limited) of discretionary executive action,67
 or premising the acceptance of congressional delegations of rulemaking
 authority on the existence of judicial review adequate to assure the legal
 ity of its exercise.68 It thus appears that judicial review of the executive's
 exercise of discretion, in regulatory contexts, need not merely be permis
 sive; in at least some contexts, it is required. Even so, Congress has allo
 cated the duties subject to judicial review to agencies, and not to the re
 viewing courts. "The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
 for that of the agency."69 Suppose a court were to conclude that the ambi
 61. Ex parte Bakelite Coq)., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (enumerating cases).
 62. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
 64. 285 U.S. at 50-51 (citing Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272; Ex parte Bakelite,
 279 U.S. 438).
 65. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meitzer Sc David L.
 Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 324-83 (6th ed.
 2009) (exploring contours of legislative court doctrine); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
 Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011) (same).
 66. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Schor).
 67. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
 68. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); see also supra text
 accompanying note 37.
 69. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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 guity of statutory language reflects a congressional design to create a pol
 icy space within which resolutions should be achieved by the agency on
 which it had conferred duties, not by the courts. An agency's giving pre
 cise shape to imprecise language could as readily be called "interpreta
 tion" as "policy effectuation." Is it necessarily, then, a part of the domain
 which, as to justiciable controversies, is "exclusively" for the courts?
 While there were occasional earlier intimations,70 the poster child
 for this question is, like Skidmore, a 1944 decision of the Supreme Court,
 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.11 Hearst required the Court to review a
 judgment of the Labor Board that regular, full-time persons selling
 Hearst's newspapers on the street were its "employees," and hence sub
 ject to the provisions of national labor relations law. The Court first inde
 pendently reached the conclusion that these workers were neither necessar
 ily nor impermissibly to be so regarded. In doing so, it explored for itself
 three possibilities for negotiating the intermediate space created by the
 uncertainty of the word "employee." First, the term might be understood
 as invoking state law on the subject—but the Court thought Congress
 would not have chosen for the regulation of interstate commerce an ap
 proach whose results might vary across neighboring states' lines.72 Sec
 ond, perhaps "employee" should be understood to have a consistent
 meaning in federal law, a meaning that Congress had invoked—but, on
 considering a variety of statutes the Court found no such consistency of
 usage.73 What remained was the conclusion that meaning in the "space"
 between what "employee" must mean and what it cannot mean was to be
 assigned with a view to national labor policy. But then, the Court rea
 soned, Congress had allocated the formulation of national labor policy,
 in relation to the concerns of the National Labor Relations Act, to the
 Labor Board and not to the courts.74 The necessary implication of these
 independent judicial conclusions of law was that the task for the Court
 was oversight—to see to it that the Board had stayed within its allocated
 space, and within that space had acted reasonably.
 To be sure, this decision was doubtless a further element of the post
 New Deal Court's care to subordinate itself to Congress—to abjure the
 confrontational, legislation-resistant style that characterized the era that
 ended with the "switch in time that saved nine."75 Its acceptance of ad
 70. Cf. Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920) ("It is settled by many
 recent decisions of this court that a regulation by a department of government, . . . the
 administration of which is confided to such department, has the force and effect of law if
 it be not in conflict with express statutory provision.").
 71. 322 U.S. Ill (1944).
 72. Id. at 122-23.
 73. Id. at 129.
 74. Id. at 130.
 75. See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2
 J. Legal Analysis 69 (2009). The first Justice Roberts, the timely switcher, was the lone dis
 senter from Hearst, certain for himself that "newsboys are not 'employees'" and that "[t]he
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 ministrative space" created by statutory imprecision is nonetheless strik
 ing for that. The Court did not surrender the "exclusive" judicial func
 tion of interpretation so much as to refine it: It determined, for itself,
 what the statute could (and could not) mean.76 Only what the language
 left open was allocated to the Board's "reasonable" determination—
 because, as the Court found, allocating it there was what Congress must
 have intended to do.77 One readily supposes that recognition of such im
 plications in Congress's decision to create administrative actors reduces
 confrontation between the two branches, adding to the Court's standing
 as a "faithful servant" of the political branches that had taken over the
 principal responsibility for the legal order from the nineteenth century's
 common law courts. Like the "switch in time," signals of respect for
 Congress's allocation of duties to administrative agencies and acceptance
 of Congress's wish that the courts oversee their performance significantly
 reduced the interbranch friction that less than a decade earlier had so
 threatened the Court.
 The Administrative Procedure Act,78 passed soon after Hearst,
 worked no necessary change in this bifurcation of judicial role—with
 courts deciding for themselves the possible meanings of statutes allocat
 ing authority to agencies, but then, within that "space," accepting the
 agency's responsibility and policing its exercise for reasonableness. To be
 sure, section 706, which defines the generous scope of judicial review
 under the APA, repeatedly emphasizes judicial responsibility for legal is
 sues. The reviewing court is to "decide all relevant questions of law, in
 terpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean
 ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action."79 It "shall. . . hold
 unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be ... in excess of
 statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory
 right."80 Yet, as in Hearst, among the "relevant questions of law" are
 whether statutory meaning is uncertain and, if so, whether congressional
 action has committed the judicially-found areas of uncertainty to agency
 administration. Interpretation of statutory provisions can produce the
 understanding that Congress has taken precisely this course, as techno
 logical complexities, policy sensitivities, or similar considerations may
 question who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a question of
 the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question."
 322 U.S. at 135-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts was the last Justice sitting at
 the time to have been appointed before Franklin Roosevelt's election as President.
 76. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), often thought to be in ten
 sion with Hearst, is just such a case, in which the Court determined for itself what the stat
 ute meant. For a discussion of Packard, see infra text accompanying note 102.
 77. 322 U.S. at 130-31.
 78. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
 of 5 U.S.C.).
 79. 5U.S.C. §706 (2006).
 80. Id.
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 suggest. "Excess of statutory jurisdiction ... or short of statutory right
 readily suggests some space between, space within which the agency may
 exercise policymaking discretion. And section 706(2) provides that such
 exercises of discretion are to be reviewed, to determine whether they are
 "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor
 dance with law."81
 B. Chevron and Beyond
 The reader who has come this far has, one hopes, begun to under
 stand why the Court was so unaware of the turmoil its unanimous deci
 sion in Chevron would stir up.82 To be sure, the problem has been to some
 extent the product of Justice Stevens's infelicitous phrasing in summariz
 ing the Court's conclusions:
 When a court reviews an agency s construction of the statute
 which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
 always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
 the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
 that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
 must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
 Congress, [n.9] If, however, the court determines Congress has
 not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
 does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
 would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpre
 tation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
 to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
 agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
 statute, [n. II]83
 The relevant footnotes read:
 [n.9] The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statu
 tory construction and must reject administrative constructions
 which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, em
 ploying traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
 that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
 that intention is the law and must be given effect.
 [n.ll] The court need not conclude that the agency con
 struction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to
 uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
 have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
 proceeding.84
 81. Id. § 706(2) (A).
 82. For more, see another of Thomas Merrill's luminous works, The Story of Chevron.
 The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 358 (Peter Strauss
 ed., 2006).
 83. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
 (1984) (footnote 10 omitted) (citations omitted).
 84. Id. at 842-43, nn.9 & 11 (citations omitted).
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 'Precise question at issue and 'permissible' misleadingly suggest
 that judicial inquiry is limited to determining whether a statutory provi
 sion has a single, determinate meaning; and, if not, that the residual
 question is only whether the meaning given by the agency was a possible
 one—within the statute's linguistic parameters. On that reading, the ju
 dicial inquiry would end without concern for the reasonableness of the
 agency's judgment within the space statutory language afforded it. The
 two-step process, hardly an innovation,85 would have been better ex
 pressed (as it now appears to have been understood86) as, first, whether
 the statutory language precludes the meaning attached to it by the
 agency and, second, whether in giving the statute the application it did
 within its "space," the agency had acted reasonably.87 This framing of step
 one may be found in the first, case-supported sentence of the Court's
 footnote 9, confirmed by the use of "permissibly" in footnote 11. Step
 two, thus seen, is merely what section 706(2) (A) of the APA commands.88
 Possibly, as Professor Kevin Stack has thoughtfully suggested to me,
 one could regard review of the agency's judgment within its Chevron
 space for reasonableness as still having an element of statutory interpre
 tation to it. If the reviewing court ought not substitute its preferred in
 terpretation for the agency's, still it may be able to say that a reading pos
 sible as a matter of syntax is unreasonable given the agency's responsibil
 ity reasonably to further statutory purposes. One might, for example, be
 able to rationalize MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. ATäfl89 in just this
 way. The FCC had understood its statutory permission to "modify" the
 requirements of rate-setting, conferred by its 1934 statute, to permit it
 almost entirely to excuse MCI from rate-setting at a time when the devel
 opment of microwave transmission of telephony had virtually eliminated
 85. In addition to Hearst, one can find it, for example, in the paragraphs describing
 judicial review of agency discretion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
 U.S. 402, 410-11(1971).
 86. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in
 part and dissenting in part) ("The fact that Congress has left a gap for the agency to fill
 means that the courts should defer to the agency's reasonable gap-filling decisions, not
 that the courts should cease to mark the boundaries of delegated agency choice."); Nat'l
 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989-97 (2005) ("That
 silence suggests, instead, that the Commission has the discretion to fill the consequent
 statutory gap.").
 87. That is, in the terms captured by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) review. See generally
 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16 (utilizing two-step process); cf. Note, Justifying the Chevron
 Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 2043, 2048-49 (2010) (seeing
 Chevron as accommodating policy advantages of agency interpretation and role of judiciary
 in ensuring clarity in the law).
 88. See generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253 (1997). Since 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) requires courts to review not only
 for ultra vires issues, but also to determine whether agency action is "arbitrary, capricious,
 an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," one wonders how any
 other conclusion is possible for a law-abiding court.
 89. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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 the natural monopoly created by the requirement for landlines that had
 been present when the statute was enacted. While the majority opinion
 rejecting this reading can be understood simply as considering what
 meanings "modify" could permissibly have in the context in which it was
 expressed90—the step one question—one could also understand it as a
 finding that the agency's linguistically permissible treatment of "modify"
 was inconsistent with the statutory purposes attributable to the Congress
 of 1934. Even if understood in the latter way, there would be no need to
 differentiate policy from interpretive judgments; the reasonableness
 question can be answered with equal force from either perspective.
 In general, Chevron s reasoning process is consistent with this softer
 understanding. It considers for itself, in great detail, whether the statu
 tory term at issue in the case, "stationary source," has a meaning that
 precludes the understanding that the agency had reached (either be
 cause a necessary meaning had been denied, or an impermissible mean
 ing assigned).91 It equivocates whether the agency's action was "interpre
 tation" strictu sensu or the implementation of a policy judgment permit
 ted by the statutory language, one that could be revisited as changing
 circumstances might suggest. It is a well-recognized feature of conclu
 sions agencies reach in their Chevron space, affirmed in the opinion itself,
 that they may be revised, even time and again,92 as circumstances and rea
 son are found to dictate. Understanding these agency judgments as pol
 icy judgments, not interpretations in the judicial sense, is underscored in
 Chevron's closing passages, which address the preferability of political to
 judicial oversight for the programmatic character and level of detail in
 volved in the "stationary source" issue.93 The opinion addresses the rea
 sonableness of the agency's approach by relating it to its statutory re
 sponsibilities and its understanding of the circumstances within which it
 was carrying them out.
 Seen m this way, Chevron s sole innovation was to convert Hearsts
 finding that (given the implausibility of other approaches) the range of
 possible meanings inherent in the Labor Act's use of "employee" re
 flected an actual congressional creation of space for Labor Board judg
 ment, into a presumption that any "space" created by congressional im
 precision in creating agency duties of administration is, similarly, a
 commitment to the agency for judgment. This "space" model might be
 represented in the following diagram:
 90. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986-92.
 91. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859-66
 (1984).
 92. See, e.g., Epilepsy Found, of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir.
 2001) (noting "Board has 'changed its mind' several times in addressing this issue," but
 holding court must defer to choices made pursuant to policy determinations when they
 are "clear and reasonable").
 93. 467 U.S. at 864U66.
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 Diagramming Chfmíon Space
 Necessary meaning
 (judicially determined)
 Chevron space of




 The middle ring is the agency's range of administration, its "Chevron
 space." How wide that space is will vary, not only from statute to statute,
 but also with the predilection of judges to find statutory language more,
 or less, certain. For a self-confident textualist like Justice Scalia, as indeed
 he has asserted,94 the middle ring may prove to be a good deal narrower
 than it will be for ajustice more likely to find room in statutory language,
 such as Justice Breyer. Its link to delegation issues, made explicit by
 Justice Stevens's closing passages, will influence its dimensions as well—
 contributing, injustice Scalia's colorful expression, to a disinclination to
 find "elephants in mouseholes."95
 The boundary-influencing, space-defining factor perhaps most im
 portant to note here is "Skidmore weight." Skidmore weight, as established
 above, is one of those "traditional tools of statutory construction" Justice
 Stevens refers to in footnote 9 of the Chevron opinion.96 In the wake of
 Chevron, a fair amount of attention (often derogatory) was given to the
 question whether agency conclusions about the space available to their
 94. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
 Duke L.J. 511, 520-21 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
 apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often
 that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.").
 95. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see MCI Telecomms.
 Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-29 (1994) (declining to find meaning of "modify" was
 ambiguous); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)
 ("As in MCI, we are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a deci
 sion of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.").
 96. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
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 administration were themselves entitled to what has conventionally been
 called "Chevron deference." To say so—to conclude that courts have only
 an oversight function in relation to agency self-determinations about ju
 risdiction—would indeed be in sharp conflict with the proposition that
 " [t] he interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable
 controversies, is exclusively a judicial function."97 But no such conflict is
 entailed when courts defining the extent of an agency's Chevron space
 give Skidmore weight to its judgments about the boundaries of its statutory
 authority. The lines defining an agency's Chevron space must be judicially
 determined, a determination that is, irreducibly, a statement of what the
 law is. But that unmistakably judicial determination should be informed
 by agency judgments in ways that have been conventional at least since
 1827.98
 1. Cases Understandable as Judicial Determinations of Permissible or Imper
 missible Meaning. — Law school teaching materials have long questioned
 whether Hearst, and later Chevron, could be reconciled with decisions that
 seemed oblivious to agency judgments about meaning. Typical of the
 former is Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRBand of the latter, INS v.
 Cardoza-Fonseca.100 But both cases can be seen to involve independent
 judicial determinations of the range of permissible statutory meaning;
 for such determinations, the question is whether the agency's judgment
 is entitled to Skidmore weight.101
 Thus, in Packard, the statute defined an ' employer as any person
 acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly"; the question
 for the Court was whether any employee who in some respects served as a
 foreman could ever be considered a statutory "employee" under the la
 bor laws, or rather must always be considered an employer.102 The
 NLRB's judgment had wavered over time—in this case, coming down on
 the side of "employee" status for the 1,100 foremen involved. This was,
 the Court declared, a "naked question of law"103—that is, had the NLRB
 reached an impermissible interpretation of the Labor Act? It presented,
 then, an issue of boundary definition—Skidmore, and not Hearst. While
 97. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (emphasis
 added).
 98. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827); see also supra
 notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
 99. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
 100. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
 101. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation & Law
 making Under Chevron, 6 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 187, 199 (1992) (discussing arguments that
 "the judicial function is only to determine what authority has been conferred upon the
 agency" and noting "[w]here an agency acts pursuant to [that] delegated... authority,
 the task of interpretation is merely to define the boundaries of the zone of indetermi
 nacy") .
 102. 330 U.S. at 486-89.
 103. Id. at 493.
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 the Justices agreed with the Board, they accorded its judgment no weight
 in reaching their conclusion, and, indeed, the Board's vacillation on the
 issue provided a standard reason, under Skidmore, for their not doing
 so.104
 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the question was whether, in considering two dif
 ferent Immigration Act provisions under which an otherwise deportable
 alien might seek discretionary relief, the Immigration and Naturalization
 Service had permissibly construed the differing language of the two stan
 dards to have identical meaning. One provision referred to a "well
 founded fear" of persecution in the alien's home country; the other
 permitted relief if it was "more likely than not that the alien would be
 subject to persecution."105 For the majority, Justice Stevens wrote,
 The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the
 same is, of course, quite different from the question of interpre
 tation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to
 apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts. There
 is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-founded fear"
 which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of
 case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling '"any gap left,
 implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,'" the courts must respect
 the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has dele
 gated the responsibility for administering the statutory pro
 gram. See [ Chevron]. But our task today is much narrower, and
 is well within the province of the Judiciary. We do not attempt
 to set forth a detailed description of how the "well-founded
 fear" test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the
 Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that
 the two standards are identical.106
 For Justice Scalia, who has consistently resisted double standards—
 whether for deference to agencies' interpretations107 or for review of
 their factual findings108—this may have been "flatly inconsistent" with
 104. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of such a judg
 ment in a particular case will depend upon ... its consistency with earlier and later pro
 nouncements .. ..").
 105. 480 U.S. at 423.
 106. Id. at 448 (citations omitted).
 107. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (ar
 guing majority "opinion ma[de] an avulsive change injudicial review of federal adminis
 trative action").
 108. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For the panel, then-Judge Scalia wrote,
 [I]n their application to the requirement of factual support the substantial evi
 dence test and the arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same. The former
 is only a specific application of the latter, separately recited in the APA not to es
 tablish a more rigorous standard of factual support but to emphasize that in the
 case of formal proceedings the factual support must be found in the closed re
 cord as opposed to elsewhere.
 Id. at 688-90; see also supra note 31.
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 Chevron, making "deference a doctrine of desperation."109 Yet, again,
 what the Court was doing was limiting the boundaries of the agency's
 discretion. The agency's approach to the two statutory provisions, treat
 ing them as identical, signaled its error in interpreting its authority; its
 inconsistent approach to the issue over the years110 signaled the absence
 of any Skidmore weight to its judgment. Justice Stevens reiterated his view
 in a 2009 concurrence, again drawing fire from Justice Scalia.111
 2. Has the Agency Exercised Its Authority Within Its Space? — To say that
 a statute creates Chevron space for an agency is not to say that all agency
 activity serves to perform such "[d]uties"112 as Congress has thus con
 ferred upon it. Two related characteristics of Skidmore largely differenti
 ated it from the long line of cases on which it drew: The case involved
 private litigation to enforce a federal statute, not the review of agency ac
 tion as such; and the agency interpretation of that statute (to which
 Justice Jackson indicated weight might attach) was the product of infor
 mal agency advice-giving, not the rulemaking or adjudication by which
 agencies generally act to affect legal rights.113 Decision of the dispute
 over meaning, then, was inevitably for the courts; the agency had indi
 cated its understanding, but not in a manner that had any legal effect.
 Nothing other than weight could have been relevant. Chevron, per contra,
 by its second-step commitment to oversight of the reasonableness of
 agency action, entails that agency action will be before the court for re
 view, and that the agency will have acted within its "space" in a manner
 characterized by legal effect.
 All of this was effectively captured by the Court, first in Christensen v.
 Harris Countylu and then, definitively, in United States v. Mead Carp,115 In
 Mead, the Customs Service, which might have adopted a challenged tariff
 classification by notice-and-comment rulemaking, had instead acted by
 an informal ruling letter. This letter required Customs Service personnel
 to act in accordance with its terms with respect to the particular importa
 tion matter at issue, but those terms could be modified or revoked at any
 time "without notice to any person, except the person to whom the letter
 was addressed"; "no other person should rely on the ruling letter or as
 sume that the principles of that ruling will be applied in connection with
 any transaction other than the one described in the letter."116 This one
 109. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
 110. Id. at 446 n.30 ("An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for height
 ened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken
 through the years.").
 111. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 528 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
 dissenting in part); id. at 525 (Scalia,J., concurring); see also infra note 129.
 112. U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
 113. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,139-40 (1944).
 114. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
 115. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
 116. 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c) (2000) (amended 2002).
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 time, informal advisory transaction, the Court concluded, was not agency
 behavior within its Chevron space—not an exercise of Congress's delega
 tion to the Customs Service of authority to adopt regulations that, if
 valid, would bind the world including itself; since it was not "administra
 tive action with the effect of law," then, to the extent it entailed the
 agency's understanding of its constituent statute, only Skidmore weight
 was relevant for a reviewing court.117
 Justice Scalia s lone and furious dissent reflected his refusal to rec
 ognize any difference between Skidmore weight and Chevron space.118
 Skidmore, he contended, had been cast on the judicial waste pile. So long
 as there had been an "authoritative" agency interpretation of an ambigu
 ous statutory provision, Chevron controlled.119 It was a matter of indiffer
 ence to him whether that interpretation had been promulgated pursuant
 to a statutory delegation—that is, in a manner Congress would have in
 tended to carry the force of law. Strikingly, in support of his conclusion
 that the interpretation at issue was "authoritative," he was prepared both
 to credit postdecision rationalizations created by government attorneys120
 and to ignore the agency's clear statement that its individuated ruling let
 ter had no staying power whatsoever.121
 117. 533 U.S. at 229-31, 234-35. To be sure, as Professor Ronald Levin pointed out,
 what the Customs letter provoked was an actual refusal of entry to the goods involved, save
 upon payment of the duty to which Mead Corp. was objecting—and in this respect the
 Customs inspectors were undoubtedly acting within Customs's delegated authority. See
 Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 771
 (2002); see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
 S. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 (noting Justice Scalia's argument for why "the interpretation con
 tained in the Customs ruling letter" qualified for "Chevron deference"). Nonetheless,
 Customs officials had not acted to "make law" for the world generally or even for its agents
 save in this sole instance—placing its action in the shadow world of "guidance," where ac
 tions are frequently taken well down in an agency's bureaucratic hierarchy and judicial
 review frequently is unavailable. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking
 Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 803
 05 (2001) (discussing tiered analysis of agency action and impact of guidance material).
 Had Customs given any signal of the enduring quality of its action, perhaps the outcome
 would have been different. Cf. Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443
 F.2d 689, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding letter constituting deliberative action at highest
 level of agency final and thus permitting review).
 118. 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 119. Id. at 241 (emphasis omitted).
 120. See id. at 258 (arguing Solicitor General's brief does not constitute post hoc ra
 tionalization). But see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419
 (1971) ("The lower courts based their review on the litigation affidavits that were pre
 sented. These affidavits were merely 'post hoc' rationalizations, which have traditionally
 been found to be an inadequate basis for review." (citation omitted)); Burlington Truck
 Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962) ("The courts may not accept appellate
 counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action."); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I),
 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
 are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.").
 121. See 533 U.S. at 223 (describing ruling letter's lack of continuing authority).
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 At least one of Justice Scalia s arguments—a fear that the resulting
 judicial interpretations would lead to ossification of law Congress meant
 to leave flexible122—is at best question-begging. As the subsequent deci
 sion in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
 Services would hold, over another lonesome fulmination by Justice Scalia,
 any judicial decision in an agency's Chevron space has the same qualities
 as a decision in the diversity jurisdiction under Erie Railroad Co. v.
 Tompkinsm—it decides the case but does not fix statutory meaning.124
 The closing portion of Justice Souter's opinion for the remainder of the
 Court in Mead remarked, not without reason, that "Justice Scalia's first
 priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court's choice
 has been to tailor deference to variety."125
 To be sure, as my casebook colleague Professor Todd Rakoff re
 minded me, Justice Souter wrote his opinion in Mead in "deference"
 terms, characterizing Chevron as incorporating "an additional reason for
 judicial deference" on top of Skidmore.m This approach may have con
 tributed to the confusing and (in my judgment) unnecessary "Step Zero"
 Professor Cass Sunstein ascribed to Mead.127 Writing about "the two-tiered
 analysis of equal protection claims," Chevron's author observed that it
 "does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but
 rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that ac
 tually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."128 Using
 "deference" as a multilevel concept has the same problem. The "Skidmore
 weight, Chevron space" regime, it is here suggested, is that single stan
 dard, one that could be applied in a reasonably consistent fashion and
 without any need to invent additional "steps."129
 The possible simplicity of the Court's decision in Mead, which pre
 dominantly looked for either legislative rulemaking or formal adjudica
 tion as the indicator that an agency had acted in its Chevron space, was
 122. Id. at 247-48 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
 123. 304U.S. 64 (1938).
 124. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
 (2005); see Bamberger, supra note 14, at 1310-11 (discussing "provisional precedent"
 eventually adopted in Brand X).
 125. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236 (footnote omitted).
 126. Id. at 229.
 127. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 213-16 (2006).
 128. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
 Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 Geo. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) (dis
 cussing multilevel deference analysis).
 129. That Justice Stevens, author of the passage just quoted, came to see his opinion
 in Chevron in just this light is suggested by his opinion in Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511,
 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The fact that
 Congress has left a gap for the agency to fill means that courts should defer to the agency's
 reasonable gap-filling decisions, not that courts should cease to mark the boundaries of
 delegated agency choice." (footnote omitted)).
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 put to the test in Barnhart v. Walton}30 In Barnhart, the same eight Justices
 treated an interpretation that had not been adopted by regulation, but
 that had appeared in many rulings and official manuals over many years,
 as having occurred in the Social Security Administration's Chevron
 space.131 Might not that behavior be regarded as having the force of law,
 in the sense of having become part of the agency's common law on the
 subject, such that a court would not permit the agency to abandon it
 without formal action and explanation?132 Decades earlier, in a tax case
 arising under similar circumstances, the Court remarked that 1RS inter
 pretations had "acquired the force of law."133 Yet this was not saying, as
 courts might say of their own acts of statutory interpretation,134 that the
 resulting ascription of meaning to statutory language would ordinarily
 require congressional action to change. Agency actions in Chevron space
 are open to reasoned reexamination. The "force of law" observation sim
 ply affirmed a norm courts should respect if it was a reasonable treat
 ment of ambiguous statutory language, a norm open to the agency to
 change as reason or changing circumstances might warrant.135
 3. And If an Agency Has Not Yet Exercised Its Authority on an Issue Within
 Its Chevron Space, What Is the Impact of a Judicial Decision of That Issue ? — If
 a statute's creation of Chevron space is to be understood as the commit
 ment to the agency involved of the responsibility for its administration,
 that understanding could not be defeated by the happenstance that an
 issue falling within it happened first to be presented in litigation in court.
 130. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
 131. Id. at 219-20 (discussing reasonableness of agency's "longstanding interpreta
 tion") .
 132. See Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1989) (requir
 ing agency to explain significant departure from its prior position).
 133. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959).
 134. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996) (insisting congressional ac
 tion is required to change Court's interpretations of statutes). Note, however, that this
 proposition holds with force only at the level of the Supreme Court, which decides rela
 tively few statutory questions annually. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per
 Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
 Administrative Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1121 (1987) (understanding Chevron as
 means for promoting uniform national law under agency administration). Moreover, even
 in the judicial context (as, for example, in Skidmore itself), some decisions involving appli
 cations of statutes are best characterized as law-applying, not "interpretation" per se. No
 principle prevents a court from identifying ambiguities in a statute lying wholly outside the
 ambit of any agency's responsibility for administration as themselves demarking what is in
 effect Chevron space, committed to the courts for reasoned application in the circum
 stances of the particular time and place.
 135. Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941) (holding that even reenactment
 of the underlying statute without change "does not mean that the prior construction has
 become so embedded in the law that only Congress can effect a change"); Helvering v.
 Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939) (holding that denying this flexibility "would de
 prive the administrative process of some of its most valuable qualities—ease of adjustment
 to change, flexibility in light of experience, swiftness in meeting new or emergency situa
 tions"). Thus, here we find the idea of Chevron space four decades earlier.
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 A century ago, the Supreme Court recognized, in the rate-setting con
 text, that judges might be well-advised to refer certain matters to the re
 sponsible agency rather than themselves decide them.136 The doctrine of
 "primary jurisdiction" the Court thus recognized, though different in its
 details, confirms the importance of judicial respect for valid congres
 sional assignments of decisional responsibility to others. And its relation
 ship to Chevron's teaching has not gone unnoticed:
 Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was originally
 rooted in the notion that agencies have greater expertise, ex
 perience, and flexibility than courts in dealing with regulatory
 matters, as well as in a desire for uniform application of the
 law, . . . abstention in favor of agencies charged with resolving
 conflicting statutory policies also promotes the proper relation
 ships between courts and administrative agencies. This follows
 naturally from Chevron, which explained that deference to
 agencies was appropriate not only because of agency expertise
 but also because Congress is presumed to delegate the policy
 choices inherent in resolving statutory ambiguities to the
 agency charged with implementation of the statute.137
 In 1994, in affirming a lower court judgment that certain fees were
 "reasonable" within the meaning of a statute left to the administration of
 the Department of Transportation, the Supreme Court not only regret
 ted the failure of the parties to have involved the Secretary, whose judg
 ment it said would have warranted Chevron's application,138 but also af
 firmatively stated, in a footnote citing Chevron, that
 [ijt remains open to the Secretary, utilizing his Department's
 capacity to comprehend the details of airport operations across
 the country, and the economics of the air transportation indus
 try, to apply some other formula (including one that entails
 more rigorous scrutiny) for determining whether fees are "rea
 sonable" within the meaning of the AHTA; his exposition will
 merit judicial approbation so long as it represents "a permissi
 ble construction of the statute."139
 Were there any doubt that decisions with an agency's delegated
 Chevron space are its responsibility, without necessary regard to prior ju
 dicial decision of the point, that was settled by National Cable &
 Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,140 The Ninth Circuit
 had once held, in litigation not involving the FCC, that certain Internet
 services were "telecommunications," not "information" services;141 when
 136. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
 137. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations omit
 ted), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1117 (1991).
 138. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1994).
 139. Id. at 368 n.14 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
 140. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
 141. AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000).
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 the FCC subsequently reached the opposite conclusion, the Ninth
 Circuit, invoking this interpretation as precedent, reversed. Eight Justices
 agreed—-Justice Scalia once again angrily dissenting—that the FCC's
 conclusion had been reasonably reached within its Chevron space.142 The
 Ninth Circuit had not acted improperly in deciding the earlier litigation,
 but given the nature of the question presented to it, it erred in later in
 sisting on the FCC's obedience to this previously stated view:
 A court s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
 agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
 only if the prior court decision holds that its construction fol
 lows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves
 no room for agency discretion. This principle follows from
 Chevron itself. Chevron established a "presumption that Congress,
 when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by
 an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved,
 first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
 (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discre
 tion the ambiguity allows."
 Since Chevron teaches that a court s opinion as to the best
 reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with ad
 ministering is not authoritative, the agency's decision to con
 strue that statute differently from a court does not say that the
 court's holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may, con
 sistent with the court's holding, choose a different construction,
 since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within
 the limits of reason) of such statutes.143
 The situation can be analogized quite precisely, as Professor
 Kenneth Bamberger did even before this decision,144 to that faced by fed
 eral courts deciding in the diversity jurisdiction (or, for that matter, to
 that faced by any court led by conflict of laws principles to divine the law
 of another jurisdiction) : The court's authority is limited to deciding the
 matter before it. If its decision has any precedential force at all, that force
 is limited to other courts within its hierarchical sphere of command and
 will be defeated as soon as the governing jurisdiction can be seen to have
 reached a differing, valid conclusion. Authority that Congress allocates to
 the FCC is the counterpart of the authority of New York courts over New
 York law. In any given case, the Second Circuit might have to decide
 some proposition of New York law or within the FCC's delegated author
 ity. That court's decision, however, constitutes the law neither of New
 York nor of the FCC.
 142. 545 U.S. at 986.
 143. Id. at 982-83 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
 144. Bamberger, supra note 14, at 1306-08 (discussing interaction of state and fed
 eral courts in interpreting unsettled state law issues).
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 Conclusion
 Occam's razor can be a treacherous tool. Nonetheless, it is urged, a
 simple and rational synthesis of the leading cases can be made without
 difficulty, if one abandons the confusions of "deference" for the distinct
 qualities of "weight" and "space." Agency views of statutory meaning may
 often be entitled to considerable weight when judges come to decide for
 themselves issues of statutory meaning. American courts have recognized
 this proposition for almost two centuries.145 More recently we have come
 to understand and accept that executive agencies may be vested by
 Congress with authority to act with the force of law, so long as the
 boundaries of that action can be judicially determined. In that space, the
 agency is the prime actor, and the very conclusion that Congress has
 delegated authority to it commands reviewing courts to act, not as decid
 ers, but as overseers.
 145. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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